London v. Zoning Bd. of Phila.

Legislation is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, constitutional challengers must overcome a heavy burden to prevail. A challenged provision is invalid, as being overbroad, if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. Provisions are only void for vagueness if “persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its application.”

London v. Zoning Bd. of Phila., 173 A.3d 847 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 11/15/17


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Dambman v. Bd. of Supervisors

Where a township’s subdivision and land development ordinance is silent as to when a zoning permit must be obtained in relation to an application for approval of a land development plan, there is no requirement that an applicant obtain zoning permits before seeking approvals for the land development plan.

Dambman v. Bd. of Supervisors, 171 A.3d 969 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 10/6/17


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Marshall v. Charlestown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors

Where an ordinance allows for conditional use approval for proposed uses that are “educational” in nature but does not define the term, the definition is broad. However, when determining if a use is “educational,” courts should focus on the primary function of the facility.

Marshall v. Charlestown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 169 A.3d 162 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 8/29/17


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DiMattia v. Zoning Hearing Bd.

To determine whether a use is considered to be “customarily found” and “incidental” to the permitted use, it is proper to consider “both the type and intensity of the use and whether uses of that type and intensity are akin to uses that are customarily found or would reasonably be expected with that primary use in the area where the property is located.” A use cannot be subordinate to a residential use if the use occurs on a property where the persons engaging in it do not reside. Similarly, a use cannot contribute to the comfort, convenience, or necessity of the occupants where the use does not benefit occupants, but rather benefits other persons engaging in the use.

DiMattia v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 168 A.3d 393 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 8/9/17


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1050 Ashbourne Assocs., LLC v. Cheltenham Twp. Bd. of Comm’rs

Section 917 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) is not a statute of limitations, but an entitlement to file a land development plan within six months or longer of the granting of a special exception, as may be provided in the governing ordinances.

1050 Ashbourne Assocs., LLC v. Cheltenham Twp. Bd. of Comm’rs, 167 A.3d 828 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 8/1/17


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Appeal of Chester Cty. Outdoor, LLC

Where a proposal is not appended to a validity challenge of a zoning ordinance, the one-year time limitation to file for a building permit under Section 10916(g) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) is not applicable. Further, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to grant site specific relief if the developer did not first file an appropriate application with the local municipality. Finally, while a developer must first submit its request for site specific relief to a municipality, the trial court is the ultimate decision maker and has broad discretion as to its review of the record and additional evidence.

Appeal of Chester Cty. Outdoor, LLC, 167 A.3d 280 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017), aff’d. Appeal of Chester Cty. Outdoor, LLC, 2018 Pa. LEXIS 545.

Date of Decision: 7/28/17


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Davis-Haas v. Exeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

Where a procedural validity challenge is filed within 30 days of an ordinance’s effective date, the challenger need only prove the municipality failed to strictly comply with the required procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). Also, a challenger does not lose standing for a procedural validity challenge where the challenger sells a portion of the relevant property but maintains an ownership interest in the property during the proceedings.

Davis-Haas v. Exeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 166 A.3d 527 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 7/12/17


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Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC v. Mifflin Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

There is a presumption the governing body considered the effect of a special exception use when enacting the ordinance and determined that the use is consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the community, so long as it meets the objective requirements of the ordinance. Provided it does, objectors carry the burden to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence establishing a high degree of probability the proposed use will substantially affect the health and safety of the community and that it will generate adverse effects greater than those normally expected from the relevant type of use.

Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC v. Mifflin Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 166 A.3d 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 7/3/17


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Smith v. Ivy Lee Real Estate, LLC

This decision discusses the language and interpretation of Article VI, Section 10617, of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Code (“MPC”) as to whether a private cause of action to enforce a subdivision and land development ordinance (“SALDO”), located in Article V of the MPC, is permitted. The Court concluded the term “act” in the MPC refers to the MPC as a whole, as opposed to specific articles and titles; therefore, the private cause of action was permissible despite the SALDO provisions being located in another article of the MPC.

Smith v. Ivy Lee Real Estate, LLC, 165 A.3d 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

Date of Decision: 6/27/17


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